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Non-Tariff Barriers and Technical Regulations 
Coordinating Authors: Evgeny Vinokurov, Peter Balas, Michael Emerson, Peter Havlik, 
Vladimir Pereboyev, Elena Rovenskaya, Anastasia Stepanova, Jurij Kofner, Pavel Kabat 
 
Background 
The 3d workshop within the IIASA project “Challenges and Opportunities of Economic Integration 
within a Wider European and Eurasian Space” held on 20-21 November, 2014 in Laxenburg, Austria 
discussed the major issues related to the compatibility and costs of technical regulations used by 
different countries and unions, and also the non-tariff barriers affecting the trade among them. 
The workshop concentrated on major aspects related to the existing non-tariff barriers in trade 
between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the European Union (EU), and other 
CIS countries. The participants discussed the challenges related to the general non-tariff barriers that 
exist between the EU, the EAEU, and the CIS countries, as well as possible solutions, particularly in the 
context of recent economic and political developments.  The workshop also discussed the relationship 
between the norms and principles of international trade law contained in the provisions of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO); analyzed the legal framework of economic integration in various regions of 
the world; and reflected on the potential for eliminating unnecessary obstacles to trade, including by 
mutual recognition of conformity.  
The workshop was focused particularly on the potential effects of the implementation of Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) between the EU and Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. 
It also addressed the economic impacts of the currently applied mutual sanctions conflict” between 
the EU, the USA and some other Western nations on the one hand, and Russia on the other, their 
impacts on international trade, and on the potentials of long-term cooperation between the EU and 
the EAEU. The impacts on economies of other CIS countries, not directly involved, were also touched 
upon.    
Harmonization of legislation in the field of technical, as well as sanitary, phytosanitary, and veterinary 
regulations between the EAEU and other regions, primarily the EU, was addressed in detail. The 
discussion covered the harmonization of terminology and labeling; harmonization of national and 
regional standards with international standards; accreditation, product safety, training in the field of 
standardization and conformity assessment as well as trade facilitation. 
In order to foster interdisciplinary and international dialogue on the topic, the workshop brought 
together well-established scientists, policymakers, banks and companies representatives from around 
the world, including: Péter Balás, Deputy Director General, DG Trade, European Commission; Igor 
Finogenov, Chairman of the Management Board, Eurasian Development Bank (EDB),  Kazakhstan; 
Pavel Kabat, Director General and Chief Executive Officer, IIASA; Evgeny Vinokurov, Director, Centre 
for Integration Studies, Eurasian Development Bank; Paul de Lusignan, Leading Expert, Tariff and Non-
Tariff Negotiations, Rules of Origin,  DG Trade, European Commission, , Stefanie Harter, Head, Liaison 
Office to the German Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Justice, German Agency for 
International Cooperation, Evgeny Hotulev, Director, Department of Macroeconomic Policy,  Eurasian 
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Economic Commission (EEC), Oleg Noginskiy, Director, Ukrainian Association Suppliers of the Customs 
Union, Veronika Movchan, Director, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER), 
Alessandro Nicita, Officer-in-Charge, Trade Policy Research Section, Trade Analysis Branch, Division on 
International Trade,  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), among many 
others, with a total of 41 participants. 
The workshop participants discussed possible ways how non-tariff barriers could be reduced and 
convergence of technical regulations to the mutual benefit of all parties involved could be achieved. 
In this context, they also analyzed the opportunities and risks of economic modernization of the East-
European partnership countries, if they adapt to European technical regulations and sanitary 
requirements. Possibilities for providing a unified policy, removing bottlenecks and differences in the 
sphere of technical regulation in the EAEU countries, was examined; and the impacts of such policy on 
producers of goods and services in different regions with regard to ensuring their competitiveness 
were assessed. 
1. Non-tariff barriers and technical regulations in the EU 
Non-tariff measures are generally defined as policy measures other than ordinary customs tariffs that 
can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, 
or prices or both (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/ 2009/3). Since this definition is broad, a detailed classification 
is of critical importance so as to better identify and distinguish among the various forms of non-tariff 
measures1. 
There are several different 
variants of classifying non-tariff 
barriers. Some researchers 
include only methods intended 
to directly restrict imports in 
order to protect certain sectors 
or national industries. They 
include licensing and allocation 
of import quotas, antidumping 
and countervailing duties, 
import deposits, voluntary 
export restraints, and systems of 
minimum import prices. 
picture x: UNCTAD/Multi Agency Classification2. Others apply a broader definition, including measures 
that are not directly aimed at restricting foreign trade and are more related to the administrative 
requirements whose actions, however, restrict trade: for example, customs procedures, technical 
standards and norms, sanitary and veterinary standards, requirements for labeling and packaging, 
bottling. These are methods that are not directly aimed at restricting imports or promoting exports, 
but they often lead to such results3. 
                                                          
1  UNCTAD program on Non-Tariff Measures. International classification of non-tariff measures.  
UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2012/2/Rev.1 
2 Alessandro Nicita presentation material for the workshop. 
3 Wekipedia.org  
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Alessandro Nicita described how much of world trade is regulated by some form of NTMs. He told that 
trade coverage tends to be larger for low-income countries in highly regulated products. The SPS 
measures can distort trade as they result in relatively higher burdens for lower income countries. 
However, there is no possibility to relax health and sanitary requirements based on development 
considerations. The solution could be membership in deep trade agreements under which 
harmonization and technical assistance can 
reduce the difficulties related to compliance 
with SPS measures. The impacts of the 
European Union’s SPS measures are 
quantified by some experts as leading to 
trade diversion from lower income countries’ 
agricultural exports to the tune of about 3 
billion $US (equivalent to about 14 percent of 
their total trade). Among European 
consumers there is a growing awareness and 
demand for healthy food, bio-products. A 
growing part of these needs is supplied by 
low-income countries, where the production 
complies with EU standards – often linked to 
EU companies’ investment activities. 
picture x: How much of world trade is regulated by some form of NTMs? 
 
The European regulatory system for goods has been in place now for over 25 years, and has established 
a strong position in international rule-making.  Since 1994 the European system has covered the 
European Economic Area (EEA) countries as well. The approach has been extended further – to the 
Euromed region and to Eastern Europe. For example, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(DCFTAs) which entered into force very recently with Moldova and, Georgia and are unilaterally 
applied by the EU with respect to Ukraine, contain such provisions. With the formal entry into force of 
the latter agreement from January 1, 2016, Ukraine is also legally committed to respect these 
requirements.  The measures are applied in line with the particular conditions and preferences of the 
partner countries.  In the European neighborhood there has been substantial interest in alignment on 
the practices established over time in the EU. In technical regulation, the EaP partners have generally 
decided to set their own pace in adopting European technical rules.  
 
Paul de Lusignan presented a review of the system of standards, conformity assessment and 
accreditation in the EU. The private institutions in Europe that deal with the issues of standardization 
and accreditation are the CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in case of standardization, and the EA in 
accreditation. They have gradually extended their activities to become open to participation by 
partners in the European neighborhood outside the EEA. 
Thus, CEN Full Members include: 
• EU and EFTA standards bodies, plus ISRM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and TSE 
(Turkey) 
CEN Affiliates include: 
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• DPS Albania; SARM Armenia; SCSMP Azerbaijan; BELST Belarus; BAS Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
EOS Egypt; GEOSTM Georgia; SII Israel; JSMO Jordan; LIBNOR Lebanon; LNCSM Libya; INS 
Moldova; ISME Montenegro; IMANOR Morocco; ISS Serbia; INNORPI Tunisia; DSSU Ukraine. 
 
The EU concludes agreements also with countries outside the European neighborhood that cover some 
of these issues. The recently completed CETA Agreement with Canada (agreed in principle but not yet 
signed) also contains such provisions. Negotiations are in progress with Japan and the United States.4 
One of the major goals of these negotiations is to reduce barriers arising from non-tariff measures - 
such as standards and conformity assessment procedures. The European system will nonetheless 
overall remain in place, even if certain aspects will change as a result of these negotiations. 
 
1.1 Technical regulation between the EU and Moldova 
 
The EU-Moldova AA is provisionally applied since 1 September 2014 (EP consent on 13 November), 
similarly to the one with Georgia, as of the same date.  The Georgian and Moldovan DCFTAs both have 
a ‘deep’ and ‘comprehensive’ character and coverage, but there are some sectoral differences. Paul 
de Lusignan analyzed several combinations of a DCFTA on the example of the agreement with Moldova 
(OJEU L260 of 30.8.2014, p.4) Article 173: Approximation of technical regulations, standards, and 
conformity assessment.  
 
Under the Agreement Moldova will take the necessary measures in order to gradually achieve 
conformity with the Union's technical regulations, standards, metrology, accreditation, conformity 
assessment, corresponding systems and market surveillance system progressively incorporate the 
relevant Union acquis into its legislation in accordance with the provisions of Annex XVI to this 
Agreement, carry out the administrative and institutional reforms that are necessary to provide the 
effective and transparent system that is required for the implementation. Moldova undertook to 
refrain from amending its horizontal and sectoral legislation, except for aligning such legislation 
progressively with the corresponding Union acquis and for maintaining such alignment. 
 
According to De Lusignan, Moldova will ensure the participation of its relevant national bodies in the 
European and international organizations for standardization, legal and fundamental metrology, and 
conformity assessment, including accreditation, it will progressively transpose the corpus of European 
Standards (EN) as national standards, including the harmonized European standards. Simultaneously 
with such transposition, it’ll withdraw the conflicting national standards; and progressively fulfil the 
conditions for full membership in the European Standards Organizations5. 
 
The Parties agreed to ultimately add an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of 
Industrial Products (ACAA) as a Protocol to the Agreement, covering sectors listed in Annex XVI. These 
will be considered to be aligned once it has been agreed, following verification by the Union, that the 
                                                          
4  The EU is negotiating a trade and investment deal with the US. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) will create new trade and investment opportunities for companies, big and small, and new 
jobs.  
5 Paul de Lusignan’s presentation for the workshop. 
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relevant sectoral and horizontal legislation, institutions and standards of the Republic of Moldova have 
been fully aligned with those of the Union. 
 
It is intended to ultimately extend the ACAA to cover all the sectors listed in Annex XVI to this 
Agreement. The ACAA will provide that trade between the Parties in products in the sectors that it 
covers shall take place under the same conditions as those applying to trade in such products between 
the Member States of the EU. It should be noted that the scope of the ACAA (Annex XVI) was decided 
by Moldova after consultation with the EU. 
2.  The EU-Ukraine DCFTA: challenges and opportunities 
2.1   Non-tariff barriers between the EU and Ukraine 
 
Ukraine signed the AA/DCFTA on June 7, 2014. It was ratified by the 
European Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada on September 16, 2014. 
The scope of its provisional application is exceptionally broad (including 
the entire DCFTA, General Principles, Financial Cooperation, Final & 
Institutional provisions and provisions on political dialogue, rule of law 
and HR, economic cooperation). It is a mixed agreement thus a long 
ratification process is to be expected for its definitive entry into force. 
(In this respect further questions have emerged since the negative 
outcome of the Dutch referendum about the Agreement).  
picture x: EU exports. Ukraine‘s main trading partners in the EU, 2012  in % of total EU trade with 
Ukraine 
However, since April 2014 the EU on a temporary basis unilaterally opened its market for Ukrainian 
goods as an autonomous trade preference in order to provide support to the Ukrainian economy. This 
temporary arrangement was terminated as of January 1, 2016, when the DCFTA provisionally entered 
into force for both sides.  
 
 According to Peter Havlik, an important components of the EU-UA AA/DCFTA is the will be: Political 
part, signed on 21 March 2014 in Brussels. The DCFTA contains 15 Chapters, 14 annexes and 3 
protocols (altogether a 906-page text, the English version published in November 2012). Under the 
terms of the DCFTA the majority of customs duties (99.1% by Ukraine 
and 98.1% by the EU) will be removed as soon the Agreement enters 
into force6. As part of its asymmetric nature, Ukraine has more and 
longer transition periods sensitive sectors, including a possibility for the 
protection of the automotive sector for 15 years. The agricultural sector 
contains more protective elements, for some agricultural products the 
EU has such a possibility for up to 10 years.  
 
picture x: EU imports. Ukraine‘s main trading partners in the EU, 2012  in % of total EU trade with 
Ukraine 
                                                          
6 Peter Havlik presentation material for the workshop. 
6 
 
As a point of departure, the WTO rules will be generally applied to non-tariff barriers. However, over 
time Ukraine will progressively adapt its technical regulations and standards in sectors of its choice to 
those of the EU (the full takeover of the EU acquis would be both unnecessary and costly). 
 
 There are specific provisions concerning some sectors. Thus, the DCFTA contains trade-related rules 
on the energy sector, such as provisions on pricing, on the prohibition of dual pricing and on the 
interruptions of transit to third countries, as well as rules on non-discriminatory access to the 
exploration and production of hydrocarbons. The DCFTA also contains specific rules of origin, and 
defining the origin of products on the basis 
of which the duties applicable to traded 
goods can be determined. Importantly, the 
DCFTA ‘shall not preclude the maintenance 
or establishment of customs unions, free 
trade areas or arrangements for frontier 
traffic except insofar as they conflict with 
trade arrangements provided for in this 
agreement (Article 39).  
picture x: Ukraine‘s main trading partners, 2012 in % of total 
 
Thus, the maintenance e.g. of the existing FTA with other CIS countries, including with the EAEU is 
possible, while joining the latter is excluded, as it’s legally incompatible with maintaining a parallel free 
trade relationship with the EU (at least as long as the EAEU itself would not sign an FTA with the EU). 
 
Guillaume Van der Loo analyzed the legal aspects of the creation of a DCFTA with Ukraine. The 
objective is: “to establish conditions for enhanced economic and trade relations leading towards 
Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU’s Internal Market by setting up a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area” (legislative approximation) (Art. 1). The Agreement is very complex, it is 
unprecedented both in terms of scope and level of detail (2140 pages in the OJ, 46 Annexes, 3 protocols 
and a joint declaration). The DCFTA has a very broad range, covering all the main areas of EU-Ukraine 
trade relations: starting with “traditional scope”: (i.e. trade in goods and flanking measures) and 
including “Global Europe trade agenda issues” (e.g. competition, services, public procurement, energy, 
etc.).7  Thus, the comprehensive dimension of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA includes: national treatment and 
market access for goods; trade regimes; technical barriers to trade; sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures; Customs and trade facilitation; establishment, trade in services and electronic commerce; 
current payments and movement of capital; public procurement; intellectual property; competition; 
trade-related energy; transparency; trade and sustainable development; dispute settlement; 
mediation mechanism, etc. 
2.2. Technical regulations to be applied between the EU and Ukraine 
When in 2014 Ukraine signed and ratified the DCFTA with the EU there were heated debates about 
the readiness of the Ukrainian economy to use the opportunities and to face the challenges stemming 
                                                          
7 Guillaume Van der Loo presentation material for the workshop. 
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from the implementation of the DCFTA. It is widely recognized that the harmonization of legislation in 
the TBT/SPS spheres are among the core aspects of the DCFTA.  
According to Veronika Movchan, Ukraine has been gradually reforming its system of technical 
requirements for more than a decade, bringing those in line with the WTO rules and practices. When 
in 2008 Ukraine joined the WTO, it also took a commitment to align its national legislation with TBT 
Agreement. Under the DCFTA further commitments have been taken:  the gradual achievement of 
conformity with the EU’s technical regulations and EU standardization, metrology, accreditation, 
conformity assessment procedures and the market surveillance system in areas selected by Ukraine. 
Thus, its commitments include: 
• incorporation of the relevant EU acquis into the legislation of Ukraine (Annex III covers 5 areas 
of horizontal legislation and 27 areas of sectoral legislation); it should be noted that this is a 
small portion of the totality of EU technical regulations, 
• preservation of this alignment; 
• full participation in the European and international organizations for standardization, legal and 
fundamental metrology, and conformity assessment; 
• progressive transposition of the corpus of European standards (EN) as national standards and 
withdrawal of conflicting national standards; 
• the application, within a short time, of certain horizontal rules covering e.g. product safety and 
liability for defective products, 
• over time, once the conditions will have been created, the signing of an Agreement on 
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA). 
 
Movchan mentioned, that Ukraine has almost completed the harmonization of the horizontal 
legislation. With respect to the sectoral commitments: Ukraine currently has 46 technical regulations, 
of which 43 were designed based on the EU acquis.  32 technical regulations are enacted. Out of the 
27 sectoral legislation defined in Annex ІІІ, Ukraine passed 25 technical regulations, 22 of them were 
enacted.  Thus, there are only a few areas where Ukraine has still to pass legislation in order to 
harmonize its technical regulations 8. There are some sectors where the procedure between the 
adoption of technical regulations and entry those into practice will take much longer time. 
 
This progress notwithstanding, Ukraine still has challenges linked to the proper implementation of the 
existing legislation, the completion of harmonization of the horizontal and sectoral legislation. The 
transposition of standards, establishment of proper infrastructure, lack of training, the financial 
constraints all require further work, including the better utilization of the various forms of technical 
assistance offered by the EU and other donors.   
 
Some Ukrainian experts insist that the business sector in Ukraine has got enough time to prepare for 
the new regulatory regime on the market. According to others, however, there are some big challenges 
of implementing the AA/DAFTA between EU and Ukraine. Thus, Oleg Noginsky suggested to take into 
account the current economic situation of Ukraine, namely the lack of available funds and the low 
credit-rating of the country. Thus, enterprises are unable to attract both domestic and foreign 
investments for the transition to the new technical standards. According to Noginsky, the Association 
                                                          
8 Veronika Movchan presentation material for the workshop. 
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Agreement with the European Union does not provide special financial programs of transition to the 
new technical standards. Enterprises would have to close, their markets would be lost, and the staff 
would have to look for a new job. Accordingly, the losses of Ukraine, both in industrial and human 
resources, would be irreplaceable. To prevent such a scenario, there is an urgent need to provide 
targeted financial support to the enterprises for their transition to the new standards of production, 
or provide mechanisms for employment of freed population. The absence of such measures in the 
near future would lead to economic and social catastrophe9. Oleksandr Sharov added that according 
to the words of the earlier Ukrainian First Vice PM S. Arbuzov, the technical alignments’ costs estimates 
of 160 billion are theoretical ones. Meaning thereby the total costs of renovation of production units 
during the next 10 years, so, that goal is pure theory10.  
 
In reaction, the EU representatives called attention to the broad range of financial support provided 
to the new Ukrainian leadership (by the EU, by other national and international donors) both in the 
form of general budgetary, as well as sectoral support. There are several ongoing support project 
targeted at the TBT area aiming at facilitating harmonization with the EU’s regulatory regime. The 
recent experiences show that actually it is not the lack of support, but the lack of sufficient absorption 
capacity of the Ukrainian institutions which is the major barrier to speeding up the harmonization 
process. There is also slow progress in setting up the necessary implementing mechanism, such as the 
accreditation bodies.  
 
Michael Emerson pointed out that the DCFTA foresees that Ukraine (similarly to Moldova and Georgia) 
will repeal the existing national standards that conflict with European standards. This in practice means 
repealing old GOST standards inherited from the Soviet times11. He also added that it is not so easy to 
describe what may happen to thousands of standards, but presumably the matter can be broken down 
into key sectors or categories, as must presumably be done for the purposes of policy guidance to the 
technical work12. Another way of proceeding in a manageable way would be to take the short list of 
25 EU regulations or directives that appear in the EU-Ukraine DCFTA as specifically identified 
obligations with timetables and focus primarily on those. 
 
Thus, Emerson recommended to answer first the following questions: how far  the Eurasian technical 
standards are in line with international and/or European standards, and over what time horizon can 
their convergence be expected; where are the concrete economic problems that Russia or other 
members of the Customs Union see in the progressive Europeanisation of the technical standards by 
Ukraine over a considerable number of years according to its DCFTA with the EU; and is it possible to 
find cooperative working methods for perceived problems to identify them precisely, and then 
eliminate or minimize them case by case, rather than by proposing a sweeping systemic amendment 
to the DCFTA which is politically implausible? 
 
                                                          
9 Oleg Noginskiy presentation material for the workshop. 
10 Oleksandr Sharov presentation material for the workshop. 
11  Michael Emerson background paper “Technical Barriers to Trade around the EU-Ukraine-Eurasian Union 
Triangle towards Convergence or Conflict?”, p. 1. 
12 Technical standards listed in ANNEX III the EU-Ukraine DCFTA. 
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Péter Balás called attention to the parallel negotiations aimed exactly at these issues. The process 
started originally on a bilateral basis with Russia, has recently been turned into a trilateral negotiation, 
involving Ukraine, as well. The aim is to identify those elements of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA which might 
cause economic damages for Russia and to elaborate suitable mechanisms, such as longer transition 
periods, temporary co-existence of various technical regulations, or providing Russia and/or the EAEU 
technical assistance in order to speed up their own harmonization with international and EU standards. 
These talks, however, did not progress as fast as would be desirable as the Russian side did not provide 
many specifics about the sectors and products where the differences of technical regulations caused 
specific, quantifiable problems, neither reacted positively to the various EU and Ukraine solutions. Still, 
both the EU and Ukraine expressed their readiness to go ahead with these talks in order to achieve 
agreed outcomes before the entry into force of their DCFTA. (To be noted, that by the end of 2015 it 
has become clear that there was no way to come to agreement, thus Russia decided to suspend CIS 
relations in parallel with the start of the provisional application of after EU-Ukraine Pact of January 1, 
2016.) 
 
Valery Heyets analyzed the combines of the norms in the laws "On Conformity Assessment", "On 
Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment Procedures“, the Decree of the Cabinet 
of Ministers of Ukraine "On Standardization and Certification”. He pointed out that the law: defines 
technical regulations, rules, and standards, whose application is necessary in accordance with the 
Agreement; introduces procedure for submissions of draft technical regulations; foresees the 
adaptation of Ukrainian legislation on technical regulations and conformity assessment  procedures to 
the EU’s legislation; introduces technical regulations on the basis of the directives of the EU New and 
Global Approach and requirements corresponding to the requirements for the development of similar 
EU acts; and establishes the final date for the abolition of compulsory product certification and 
administration of conformity assessment for certain goods subject to mandatory certification. Heyets 
mentioned that today one can consider as balanced the volumes of trade between Ukraine and the EU 
in the following product groups: mineral fuel, oil and oil products, and electrical machinery. Trade in 
the remaining groups, including the high-tech industrial products, is not balanced. Heyets concluded 
that in the field of technical regulations, Ukraine has only moved in the horizontal direction (technical 
regulations framework and institutional support), where the initiative belongs to the state, including 
through the provision of financial and technical assistance from the EU. 
 
In the vertical (sectoral) direction, it is the entrepreneurs who should take the initiative, while in reality 
they prefer to increase exports to third countries (instead of investing in the development of technical 
regulations and quality) because there the potential of trade is large enough for the existing production 
facilities in Ukraine. And it is only possible to realize the existing trade potential through close 
cooperation between Ukrainian and European associations of producers rather than between the 
companies which are often competitors13. 
 
The access to the EU market for companies with foreign (European) capital is possible, but, because of 
the current military conflict, the instability of the hryvnia and other factors, European investments 
tend to decrease.  Where cooperation chains between Ukraine and the Customs Union are maintained, 
                                                          
13 Valeriy Heyets presentation material for the workshop. 
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exports could have been saved, but the suspension by Russia of the CIS relations at the start of 2016 
made this impossible. In addition, on certain finished industrial goods, metals, food and chemical 
products, the Russian market will be closed with the progress of the Russian policy of import 
substitution. 
 
In the Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union since 2011 a new system of technical regulations has 
been emerging, which is supposed to become an analogous system with that of the EU. Realizing the 
significant barriers to the development of trade, the Eurasian Commission has launched a number of 
initiatives that may, in the near future, reduce the technical barriers of trade between the countries 
of the CIS and the EU. 
3. Non-tariff measures and technical regulation in the CU/SES/EAEU 
One of the most recent examples of regional integration is the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia. It was established in 2010. On January 1, 2012 the three states formed a Single Economic 
Space to promote further economic integration. The CU has been turned into the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) as of January 1, 201514.    
 
Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan have already made a number of steps in the direction of reducing 
NTMs, in particular in the field of technical regulations: they signed an agreement on the common 
principles and rules of technical regulations, drawing up a single list of products; developed the 
technical regulations of the CU for products included in the single list; established uniform technical 
requirements for products from 2012; took a decision about the harmonization of national legislation 
in the standardization, accreditation, measurement assurance and state control of the technical 
regulations. 
 
On 29 May 2014 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement on the establishment of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, which also provides that the participating states would not apply non-tariff 
measures in the internal market, except for cases provided for by the Agreement.  
 
The Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union also established the general principles of technical 
regulations, and identified their rules and procedures (Annex 9); as well as those of the general 
principles for the application of sanitary, veterinary & sanitary and phytosanitary quarantine measures 
(Annex 12).  
 
According to Vinokurov, for the emerging Eurasian Economic Union, close economic cooperation with 
the EU is of critical importance: the EU is – or rather used to be - the largest trading partner of both 
Russia and Kazakhstan, accounting for more than half of the Russian Federation’s total trade turnover. 
The Ukrainian problem can only be resolved within the scope of deep economic cooperation between 
the EU and the EAEU, which only serves to underscore the importance of this cooperation. According 
to him for the EU close economic cooperation with the EAEU is also of fundamental importance: the 
                                                          
14 Anastasia Stepanova (2013). ‘Eurasian Union and Ukraine‘. Monography, Moscow, Russia (In Russian). 
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EAEU was up to recently the European Union’s third-largest trading partner after the U.S. and China15. 
It is also important from the security, mentality and cultural points of view. The impact of Russian 
restrictions on food imports clearly demonstrates the current level of trade interdependence and the 
interest the European manufacturers and farmers have in normal commercial relations. 
 
According to Adarov, there are some asymmetric non-tariff barriers to trade: NTBs are applied by a 
member state to one or both of its EAEU partners, while one or both partners do not implement the 
same NTB; an NTB is applied by one or more EAEU member states to the RoW, while there is at least 
one EAEU member state that does not implement the same NTB to the RoW; and an NTB is imposed 
by a member state that is in force for a period of time and is removed at a later time.  The trade 
creation effect has been dissipating for the EAEU economies, while trade diversion has remained 
strong and stable throughout the 2000s. Reduction of NTBs might be the only way to boost mutual 
trade beyond the fundamental products. The NTBs have significant implications for trade within the 
EAEU. Ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) could potentially range up to 85% for some product categories. 
Institutions and infrastructure are highly important for efficient trade 16 . Given that the EAEU 
economies are characterized by low quality of institutions and infrastructure, trade is adversely 
affected both within the EAEU and also with the rest of the world. 
 
Andrey Lipin made a presentation about the further steps in the EAEU affecting the perspectives and 
challenges of addressing non-tariff barriers. He analyzed the NTBs in a treaty on Eurasian Economic 
Union that included regulatory measures both by the CU and SES: Customs Union (custom regulation; 
external trade policy; technical regulation; sanitary and phytosanitary regulation; medical market 
regulation; consumer protect) + Single Economic Space (services, investments; energy; transport; labor 
market; government procurements; macroeconomic policy; taxes; antitrust law; etc.). He said that the 
non-tariff measures are policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs, that can potentially have 
an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing the quantities traded, the prices, or both. 
Lipin analyzed the NTB procedures (all markets) and concluded that: 
• Goods (UNCTAD classification + EEU extensions) 
• Services (There is no single classification; known approaches (UN, OECD, WB, etc.) 
• Capital, labor (too far from one classification) 
• Further steps (monitoring of NTB in external market). 
The Treaty’s implementation includes liberalization of trade of goods, services, movement of capital 
and of labor markets in the following directions: deepening of domestic market integration, legal 
harmonization and unification, treaty extension17. Thus, in the EAEU the realization of common policy 
and coordination of all the instruments are important, and reduction/elimination of NTBs have to be 
achieved. 
                                                          
15 Evgeny Vinokurov background paper “Mega Deal Between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic 
Union”, p. 2-3. 
16 Amat Adarov presentation material for the workshop. 
17 Andrey Lipin presentation material for the workshop. 
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3.1 Non-tariff barriers and business environment in the CU/SES/ EAEU 
Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan have already taken a number of steps in the direction of Eurasian 
integration, in particular in the field of technical regulations. They signed the agreement mentioned 
above about the common principles and rules of technical regulations.   
 
Igor Finogenov in his introductory speech stated that “the Eurasian Development Bank wants 
integration to help attain the following goals: joint infrastructural development, a partial departure 
from the oil-and-gas dependence, industrial development and cooperation in the areas of research 
and education”.18 
 
Evgeny Vinokurov summarized the results of EDB surveys and interviews with 530 enterprises and 
companies of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia exporting goods and services within the CU. Mikhail 
Demidenko added that this research was prepared in collaboration with Igor Pelipas, Irina Tochickaya, 
Gleb Shymanovich, Andrey Lipin, and Andrey Anisimov. 144-195 industrial companies were 
interviewed in each country to identify the respondents' views on the non-tariff barriers they face 
when exporting to the partner countries. The results of this survey also allowed to obtain quantitative 
estimates of non-tariff barriers as a percentage of the value of the goods being exported, making it 
possible to estimate the costs for businesses of each NTB19. Vinokurov explained that when classifying 
NTBs from the inventory of the EAEU, it was found that the greatest number of non-tariff measures in 
the CU and SES were sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, technical barriers, price control measures 
and measures affecting competition. Groups of measures relating to subsidies and public procurement 
restrictions were widely presented as well. At the same time, despite the fact that the EAEU inventory 
does not contain measures relating to restrictions on distribution and after-sales services, neither 
emergency trade defense measures, in the course of the survey a number of companies indicated such 
non-tariff measures in the CU and SES and their use by member states. This also points to the need of 
gathering more information about the barriers and restrictions on trade in goods within the Eurasian 
integration structure20. 
 
The results of the survey of companies exporting goods show that they assess trade within the CU and 
SES as a fairly open. The most optimistic estimates have been given by the exporting enterprises of 
Belarus, as well as by the Russian companies exporting to Belarus. Trade between Kazakhstan and 
Russia is less open, but the mutual accessibility of markets in these countries was assessed as higher 
than the ones of third countries. The only direction of trade for which exporters considered market 
access to be not above average as compared to other countries was export from Kazakhstan to Belarus. 
Respondents from member states of the CU and the SES differently assessed the impacts of NTBs on 
mutual trade. Thus, the enterprises of Belarus consider that on average individual non-tariff barriers 
have almost no restrictive effects on exports to Kazakhstan and to Russia. Companies from Russia 
assess their impacts as more significant. Non-tariff barriers have the greatest restrictive impact on 
trade for exports from Kazakhstan, in particular to Belarus. 
                                                          
18 Igor Finogenov introductory speech. 
19 Mikhail Demidenko presentation material for the workshop. 
20 EDB background paper “Non-tariff barriers in the Eurasian Economic Union: evaluation of the economic effects 
(Large scale survey)” p 2-9. 
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The main barriers that increase the costs of trade within the CU and SES are technical barriers, 
measures affecting competition, and price control measures, which followed from respondents’ 
answers about the extent of the restrictive impact of a barrier.  The impacts of technical barriers are 
assessed as significant by respondents exporting to all destinations, regardless of the methodology of 
calculation. Thus, respondents of Belarus evaluated the barriers associated with entry to the market 
and operations both in Russia and Kazakhstan at 10% of their costs. Kazakh organizations believe that 
the both groups of barriers constitute 10% of the costs in case of Belarus and 15% in case of Russia. 
The Russian organizations assessed the cost barriers in Belarus to be 13% and 15% (entry to market 
and everyday operations, respectively), and 15% and 10% in Kazakhstan.21  
 
According to Madiyar Kenzhebulat, Kazakhstan remains a net importer in its trade relations with the 
countries of the Customs Union. From 2000 to 2013, there has been a steady increase in the negative 
balance of trade with these countries. In 
trade with Russia the deficit increased 
17.6 times, and in trade with Belarus this 
figure increased 27.4 times. Concerning 
the structure of exports of Kazakhstan 
with the CU and CES countries by major 
product groups for 2013, the largest 
share was represented by commodities: 
mineral products - 42%, metals and metal 
products - 34%. In the structure of 
imports the largest shares were those of: 
machinery, equipment and vehicles - 
23%, mineral products - 21%, food 
products - 14%, metals and metal 
products - 13%, chemical products - 14%, 
textiles and shoes - 9%22.  
picture x: Adarov. Overview of WB WGI ranks of EACU economies, 2013. Source: World Bank 
 
Artem Yulegin analyzed the definition and components of the Regulatory Impact Assessment 
procedure (RIA) Procedure in the Eurasian Economic Commission. He stated that RIA was a mandatory 
step in the process of preparation of the EAEC's draft decisions, intended to identify and eliminate 
excessive obligations, limitations, and (or) bans for entrepreneurs; unreasonable business expenses; 
barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor in the territory of the Union. RIA is 
carried out by preparing a draft report in about each of these spheres. The Commission ensures the 
transparency of the RIA Procedure by internet, including through the official website of the Union.  
 
The methodological framework of the RIA includes: the best national practices of the each Member 
(Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 17 December 2012 № 1318 (the order of RIA 
                                                          
21 EDB background paper “Non-tariff barriers in the Eurasian Economic Union: evaluation of the economic effects 
(Large scale survey)” p 37-40. 
22 Madiyar Kenzhebulat’s presentation material for the workshop. 
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procedure); the OECD Recommendation С(2012)37 (Recommendations of the Council on regulatory 
policy and governance); the experiences of the European Commission’s Impact Assessment Guidelines 
of  January 15, 2009; and the experiences of the Business Development Department of the EAEC in 
business impact assessment about the drafts of the EAEC decisions. Yulegin highlighted that during the 
period from October 2, 2012 to November 6, 2014k786 (100%) drafts were considered and 115 
business impact assessment reports were prepared about the EAEC draft regulations: technical 
regulations, sanitary, veterinary and phytosanitary measures (55,65%), 64 of 194 – covering 32,99%; 
non-tariff customs regulation (20,87%), 24 of 234 –  covering 10,26%23. 
 
Leena Ilmola, Nadejda Komendantova and Anastasia Stepanova also presented the results of their 
research on the adaptation to the institutional environment and foreign companies’ sources of 
resilience. Thus, they interviewed top managers of 10 companies from finance, construction, logistics, 
consumer products, engineering, and technology. All of them were foreign-owned companies 
operating in Russia and some other CIS countries. They consider that the political risks are increasing: 
regulations, sanctions and their consequences; financing (re-financing) is very difficult for domestic 
and foreign companies (RU), currency risks are increasing. 
   
The most important criterion for business decisions is economic growth.  As several of the global trade 
studies (WTO, 2013) and more specific Eurasian Customs Union studies (Mkrtchyan and Gnutzmann, 
2014) reveal, trade barriers have an impact on economic growth. But there are also other trends, such 
as long term unemployment and growing inequality, the increasing volatility of prices of natural 
resources, growing complexity of global supply chains and consumer preferences which may have an 
even bigger role as contributors to growth (WTO, 2013). Ilmola mentioned that such issues as transport 
technology development (Kurgman, 2010) may shape a country’s comparative advantages even more 
than trade barriers. Uncertainty about the real costs and the time effects are the main business 
problems.  These uncertainties emerge from the unpredictability of the currency rates and different 
customs and licensing procedures. 
 
Stepanova added that the analysis of their interviews and the available evidence from international 
organizations such as the World Bank, UNCTAD, IFC and the Bleyzer Foundation indicate that the 
problems stem from asymmetry. From a business perspective the challenges emerge when political 
decision-making has dominance on the business environment, when some of the economic players 
have a dominant role in the market or the differences among regions within one country (and one 
regulation) are significant.   
 
Leena Ilmola and Anastasia Stepanova pointed out that their results are similar to those of global 
studies based on surveys, interviews and questionnaires, except for perceptions of such risks as wars, 
conflicts and political instability, which are cited by the UNCTAD among the major barriers. However, 
in their interviews respondents did not perceive these risks as serious barriers for investment.  On the 
other hand, the currency risk was not mentioned as a significant barrier by global studies but appears 
to be a serious threat for investors who participated in the interviews. They also mentioned the short-
term planning horizon which did not appear in global studies. At the same time such barriers as political 
                                                          
23 Artem Yulegin presentation material for the workshop. 
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risks, industrial ecosystems (Ma and Lu 2011) and slow economic growth correspond in their study to 
the results of the UNCTAD, Bleyzer Foundation and the World Bank24. 
 
 
3.2 Non-Tariff Measures Affecting the CU/SES’s Exports to the third countries 
 
Alexander Lysenko called attention to a CU/SES’s trade policy. Thus, at the multilateral level there is 
cooperation with international and regional organizations (WTO, UN, CIS, APEC, ASEAN). At the 
bilateral level there are FTA negotiations with Vietnam (active tracks), Israel, India and Egypt (feasibility 
study (Joint research group). The CU also has trade dialogues with China, EU, USA and Japan (although 
with the last 3 partners the bilateral dialogues are much restricted due to the Ukrainian crisis).  In 
EAEC’s focus there are such measures, as: tariff and non-tariff regulations, safeguard measures, 
establishment of preferential regimes with third countries, inadequate support and development to 
goods and services export and the elimination of non-tariff barriers for the CU/SES’s goods in third 
markets. Regarding the CU, measures by their nature are: 61% (trade defense measures), 11% (other 
NTM), 10% (TBT measures), 5% (quotas, including TROs), 5% (SPS measures), 5% (taxes and charges), 
3% (import bans).25  
 
Lysenko added that the new competences according to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union 
are: assistance to the EAEU’s exporters in market access to third countries; the monitoring of third 
countries’ restrictive measures, consultations with third countries and the EU’s Member States on the 
applied measures, including dispute settlement on trade issues. Meanwhile, among the quotas applied 
by the EU there are quotas for textile products from Belarus, quotas for nuclear products from Russia 
to the third countries, while the others are tariff quotas based on the WTO agreement.  
 
4. The new reality: the effect of mutual sanctions on the EU and Russia 
 
According to some experts the economic and political sanctions are considered to be ineffective in 
most cases. One study of 174 cases proposed that 34% of sanctions have been at least partly successful 
but this was contested by another analysis of the same data set, arguing that only 5% had been 
successful.  Why should sanctions be used so often when they have such a poor track record? 
According to a former UK ambassador to the UN, the reason is that: “There is nothing else between 
words and military action if you want pressure to bear on a government” (Jeremy Greenstock). 
Sanctions may therefore often become political statements more than anything else, and gestures to 
assure a minimal consistency between words and actions in the context of the domestic as well as the 
international political debate26. 
                                                          
24 Leena Ilmola, Nadejda Komendantiva, Anastasia Stepanova presentation material for the workshop. 
25 Alexander Lysenko presentation material for the workshop. 
26 Following a first summit in Minsk in on September 5, 2014, the decisions of which were not respected, on 11 
February 2015 the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany agreed on a second  package of measures to 
alleviate the ongoing war in the Donbass region of Ukraine. The talks that led to the deal, overseen by the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), were organized in response to the collapse of the 
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The European Union introduced political and economic sanctions against Russia due to the following 
reasons: Russia's policy of annexation (accession) of Crimea, direct and indirect military intervention 
in the conflict in Donbass, as well as the crash of the Malaysian Boeing over the Eastern part of Ukraine. 
Michael Emerson and other experts have pointed out that the Helsinki norms of the European security 
(1975) and some other international agreements were not respected by Russia.  
 
The EU, the US and numerous other Western countries apply sanctions due to these reasons against 
Russia, including individuals targeted with visa bans and asset freezes, and specific business sectors or 
sectors of the economy and financial system. These have been intensified stage by stage, as the initial 
packages had no impact. In total they now comprise: 
• Diplomatic sanctions: The G8 summit scheduled to take place in Sochi in June 2014 became 
the G7 in Brussels; the EU-Russia summit, also scheduled for June in Sochi, was cancelled; talks 
on visas and the “New Agreement” have been suspended; various bilateral cooperation 
programs have been suspended; 
• Individualized sanctions: The number of EU visa bans and/or asset freezes have been 
progressively extended to a total of 119 persons and 23 entities in Russia and Crimea; 
• Economic sanctions: New operations by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are to be suspended (Russia used to be the 
biggest beneficiary of EBRD operations); imports from Crimea are banned, unless certified by 
Ukraine; exports of military and dual-use goods are banned; export licenses are denied for 
specific, high-technology energy-related equipment (deep water development in the Arctic, 
and shale); access to the EU capital markets and related services is severely restricted for 
targeted major Russian banks and corporations (Sberbank, VTB, VEB, Gazprombank and 
Rosselkhozbank). (There was talk of suspending Russia from the SWIFT international bank 
payments system, but this has not been decided.) 
 
Michael Emerson added that the Minister Alexei Kudrin had spoken of his serious concerns for the 
macroeconomic developments, at least in the longer run, since for the moment Russia has large 
financial reserves of around $470 billion that could be drawn upon to compensate enterprises and 
banks that need to refinance borrowing on international capital markets. How serious these concerns 
are is hard to say. Russian enterprises are now virtually shut out from Western financial markets. This 
goes beyond the individual banks, since there is a broader market refusal to take on the perceived 
political risks, with the Western countries having clearly said that the sanctions can be further 
extended (or retracted), depending on the political developments27. 
 
In Russia, which was already “stuck in transition and stagnation” before the current crisis erupted, the 
repercussions of the conflict hamper urgently needed investments and GDP growth, hindering 
economic restructuring and modernization. Peter Havlik called attention of the participants to the fact 
that the economies of individual EU countries are affected to very differing degrees by the conflict, 
                                                          
Minsk-1 Protocol in January–February 2015. The new package of measures is intended to revive the Protocol, 
which had been agreed in September 2014. Thus, there is agreement among the key politicians agreed that 
Minsk implementation is a key to EU-Russia relations.  
27 Michael Emerson background paper “The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle”, p. 2, 6. 
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depending on their trade (and otherwise) exposure to the Russian (and Ukrainian) market. In general, 
the Baltic States (as well as Finland) and other NMS are affected more than others. At the same time, 
the Baltic States (and Poland) have adopted a much ‘tougher’ attitude towards Russia given their 
historical experience, whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic (as well as Austria, 
Greece and Cyprus) favor a ‘softer’ approach. Germany, Italy, Norway, France, Netherlands are also 
effected by the mutual sanctions. In order to assess the economic impact of the conflict, Havlik and his 
group took into account the varying trade exposure of individual EU countries towards Russia and 
constructed two alternative scenarios: 
(I) exports to Russia decline by 10%; 
(II) exports to Russia decline by 50%.28 
 
The losses incurred so far are undoubtedly painful, yet manageable (a decline in trade bigger than 10% 
would obviously lead to correspondingly greater losses). Thus, the slowdown of Russian economy 
growth rates in 2013-2014 basically was mostly result of internal causes as well as of the fall of energy 
prices. Alexander Shirov calculated the following impacts of sanctions on the Russian economy: 
• decrease of funding 7 from EU and US financial markets (US$ 150-200 billion) 
• embargo on trade of dual-use technologies (US$ 5-7 billion) 
• FDI from EU (US$ 30-50 billion) 
• internal prices (US$ 20-30 billion) 
• the reduction of production cooperation (US$ 15 billion) 
• embargo on trade of hi-tech energy technologies (up to 50-70 mln t of oil in 2030).29 
 
The main part of funding was used by Russian companies with high level of reliability; the annual 
income of EU financial system from interest payments from Russia is about US$ 25-27 billion (lost 
profits from credit embargo can reach up to US$ 8-10 billion); significant amount of the funding was 
tied with Russian capital. The impacts of sanctions on the EU: realization of the programs of import 
substitution (US$ 40 billion), embargo on food products (US $ 5-7 billion), devaluation of ruble and 
decreases of import from EU (US$ 22 billion), losses from decreases in financial services (US $ 8-10 
billion), slowdown of economic growth and import demand (US $ 5 billion), decreases of raw materials 
output (US $ 3 billion). He added that the EU losses from sanctions can amount to 0,5% of its GDP. In 
2013 import of agricultural and food products affected by embargo from EU, US, Canada, Australia, 
Norway is estimated up to US $ 8,6 billion (total import for this position was US$ 22.5 billion). Countries 
most affected by embargo were: Poland (US$ 1,1 billion), Norway (US$1,1 billion), Netherlands (US$ 
0,8 billion), Spain (US$ 0,8 billion), Germany (US$ 0,6 billion). 
 
Dmitry Mityaev called attention to the fact, that although Russia’s part in German export amounts to 
3,5% (€36 billion euro from more than 1 trillion euro), the real importance of the trade relations 
between Germany and Russia was considerably higher. Russia supplies almost half of total oil volumes 
and one third of the gas consumption within the energy needs of the EU countries. Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain imported in 2012 only 233.6 billion cubic meters (195 billion cubic meters from total 
via pipeline and 38.8 billion cubic meters of LNG). From these 195 billion cubic meters the share of 
                                                          
28  wiiw background paper “Policy Notes and Reports 14. Economic Consequences of the Ukraine Conflict”                         
p. 9-13. 
29 Alexander Shirov presentation material for the workshop. 
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Gazprom is 57.3 billion cubic meters or 30%. In Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Finland, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia the share of Russian gas in the import structure is about 100%. In 
Turkey it is 70%, in Greece and Hungary 40-45%.    
 
According to Russian views it is better for Germany and Russia to implement their joint efforts to 
stabilize the situation in Ukraine by forming a responsible government, which is capable to safeguard 
peace and observe the transit obligations, to develop a joint program of reconstruction and 
development of Ukraine, including modernization of its gas-transport system, than to transform this 
large Central European country in a reason for isolation of Russia with disruption of the European 
stability and defeat of own economy? Time for such joint actions is still exist – only positive joint 
economic program of Germany and Russia with a total amount not less than of €150-200 billion for 
the period of 2-3 years is able to stop negative progress. The condition of development of such kind of 
program is dismissal of sanctions and unacceptable ultimatums and also support of constructive forces 
in Ukraine30.  As mentioned above, Russian experts consider that, the slowdown of GDP growth in 
Russia is caused mostly by internal factors with low level of investment as a key; the exchange rate 
policy being the most efficient tool of internal market protection (it is also the main non-tariff barrier 
in trade between Russia and the EU); the EU main non-tariff policy involves technological restrictions 
(primarily those concerning energy sector and dual-use technologies); import substitution programs 
mean significant risks for the future EU exports to Russia; the decrease of the GDP growth rates in 
Russia will negatively affect the import of investment goods that may significantly impact the EU 
machinery producers.  
 
Peter Balas mentioned that the EU’s official views, and the opinions expressed by the EU participants 
at the meeting, were generally rather different from the positions above. According to the latter views 
the root cause of the current crisis lies in Russia and in its actions against Ukraine. It is for the Ukrainian 
people and not for other countries to decide what kind of leadership and policies they choose – and 
there is no doubt the all the elections which have taken place since 2014 in Ukraine were much fairer 
and cleaner than anything which took place during the country’s earlier history. While the economic 
losses are undoubtedly high for all sides concerned, the solution lies in eliminating the root cause, the 
political crisis, which has started since late 2013. 
 
Due to the current conflict situation, Anastasia Stepanova noted that it is necessary to continue to find 
compromises between the European Union, Russia and Ukraine, based on the agreements adopted by 
Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande, Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko to resolve the crisis in Ukraine. 
The compromises should be found also in the legal settlement of the mutual economic claims that 
have been introduced because of the suspension by Russia the CIS relations with Ukraine since January 
1, 2016, and due to the introduction of Russian retaliatory measures against the exports to Russia of 
products from the European Union and other countries through Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
 
Thus, twenty-five years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the current grave crisis in the relations 
between Russia and the West represents not only a major setback, but is also evolving into a dangerous 
                                                          
30 Dmitry Mityaev background paper “About consequences of introduction UAS and EU anti-Russian sanctions 
for EU countries and Ukraine”, p. 10. 
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geopolitical conflict31. The economic consequences of the conflict are equally serious: not only for 
Russia (and, of course, first of all for Ukraine), but they also pose a potential threat to the still frail 
economic recovery in Europe.   
 
The EU and Russia have a long record of cooperation on issues of bilateral and international concern32. 
Russia is the EU's biggest neighbor and used to be its third biggest trading partner. Supplies of oil and 
gas make up a large proportion of the country's exports to the EU. The European and the Eurasian 
Union would have common economic interests to reinforce their cooperation by creating in future the 
conditions for a “common space” within a framework of partnership and cooperation, and on the basis 
of common values and shared interests. It is a question of the political conditions which fall outside 
the scope the IIASA’s Eurasian Project, whether, when and how these conditions can be created. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 wiiw background paper “Policy Notes and Reports 14. Economic Consequences of the Ukraine Conflict” p. 1. 
32 www.eeas.europa.eu  
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